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ABSTRACT 
 
In the event of a terrorist attack causing mass casualties or 
nuclear, biological, or chemical contamination, emergency 
responders easily can be overwhelmed by demands for their 
services.  Advance planning by organizations with the advice of 
emergency responders to safeguard people from becoming 
victims, to care for victims before emergency responders arrive, 
and to render assistance to emergency responders once they 
arrive is critical to mitigating damage. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the morning of September 11, 2001, two long-range commercial jet 
aircraft, piloted by hijackers, intentionally crashed into the World Trade Center 
in New York City, a third hijacked jet intentionally crashed into the Pentagon 
in Washington, and a fourth hijacked jet crashed into a field after passengers 
heard on cell phones about the fate of the other three hijacked jets and 
overpowered the hijackers.  It has been hard for many Americans to come to 
grips with hopes for our destruction coming from enemies who make no 
distinction between politicians, the military, and ordinary citizens.  Despite the 
U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan to rout the al Qaeda terrorist 
organization responsible for the events of September 11, 2001, many al Qaeda 
members eluded capture and are thought by intelligence agencies to remain in 
cells throughout the world awaiting orders to act.  Al Qaeda may have recruited 
new members impressed by their success at bringing destruction to America 
and may have formed alliances with other terrorist organizations with 
ideological motives and technological capabilities to commit future acts of 
terrorism within the United States (Johnston, et al., 2002). 
 
After September 11, President Bush created a new agency of Homeland 
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Security to protect the nation from terrorist attacks.  However, the nation is so 
vast, its population so large, and potential targets so many that government 
security agencies and emergency responders currently cannot be counted upon 
to have all of the resources in place when and where they are needed to meet 
every conceivable contingency (National Commission on Terrorism, 2001).  
According to Vice President Cheney, it is not a question of if we will have 
another terrorist attack of such monstrous magnitude, but when. 
 
Although the enormity of the havoc brought to America by foreign terrorists 
has heightened awareness of the need for organizations to prepare for terrorism, 
domestic terrorism is also a threat.   Timothy McVey was convicted of killing 
168 people in the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 
1995.  Theodore Kaczynski was arrested in 1996 and charged with mailing 
bombs on 15 separate occasions to the places of work and the homes of 
business executives and professors (Associated Press, 1998).  Eric Rudolph was 
arrested in 2003 and accused of detonating bombs at the Atlanta Olympics, two 
abortion clinics, and a nightclub (Schuster, 2003). 
 
Terrorists attempt to kill, injure, or cause financial losses to targeted 
victims, and also, they often kill, injure, or cause financial losses to other 
persons with little or no concern for collateral damage.  Terrorists spread fear 
throughout society.  Ways for organizations to alleviate the fear are to 
understand the weapons and methods used by terrorists, and then to take 
actions to minimize opportunities for terrorists to strike and to plan, equip, and 
train personnel to mitigate damage if a terrorist incident occurs. 
 
II. WEAPONS AND METHODS OF TERRORISTS 
 
1. ATTACKS ON DATA NETWORKS 
 
Kevin Mitnick, who has been called a “computer terrorist” by the 
Department of Justice, was apprehended in 1996 for hacking into the computer 
networks of Motorola, Nokia, Fujitsu, Novell, NEC, Sun Microsystems, 
Colorado SuperNet, Netcom On-Line Services, and University of Southern 
California to steal proprietary software, prevent authorized users from 
accessing information stored in their accounts, and to run computer “hacking” 
programs that altered or replaced existing programs (United States District 
Court, 1996).  In February 2000, other computer hackers working in concert 
shut down the operations of CNN, Yahoo!, eBay, and Amazon.com.  Hackers 
are writing new code all the time to spread viruses through the Internet that 
attack unprotected computers and overcome anti-virus software to delete files, 
  
 
18 
 
alter files, or cause systems to crash.   
 
In 2000, the Computer Security Institute conducted a survey of large 
corporations and government agencies.  The survey reported that 90% of 
respondents had security breaches within the past 12 months; 70% experienced 
serious breaches such as theft of proprietary information, financial fraud, and 
sabotage of data networks; 74% acknowledged financial losses; and 273 
respondents were able to quantify their losses at $265,589,940 for the past 12 
months (Maniscalco & Christen, 2002).  In 2001, the executive director of 
Internet Security Alliance, stated at a House of Representatives hearing that 
four Internet worm attacks alone, including “Code Red” and “Nimda”, cost 
companies more than $10 billion in systems repairs and lost productivity, and 
Carnegie Mellon University estimated that the number of security breaches of 
computer networks more than doubled from 2000 to exceed 40,000 in 2001 
(Verton, 2001).   
 
Hackers pioneered techniques that the National Security Agency reports 
groups hostile to the United States have developed into offensive information 
warfare capabilities (Minihan, 1998).  The Rand Corporation reports that the 
United States and its allies are “vulnerable to information warfare attacks on 
their core infrastructures” (Molander, 1996).  The Defense Intelligence Agency 
explained the threat more fully: 
 
Transnational Infrastructure Warfare involves attacking a nation’s 
or sub-national entity’s key industries and utilities; to include 
telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation, water, 
government operations, emergency services, energy and power, 
and manufacturing.  These industries normally have key linkages 
and interdependencies, which could significantly increase the 
impact of an attack on a single component.  Threats to critical 
infrastructure include those from nation-states, state-sponsored 
sub-national groups, international and domestic terrorists, criminal 
elements, computer hackers, and insiders.  (Hughes, 1998) 
 
2. ATTACKS USING TACTICAL VIOLENCE 
 
Tactical violence is “the predetermined use of maximum violence in order 
to achieve one’s criminal goals, regardless of victim cooperation, level of 
environmental threat to the perpetrator, or the need to evade law enforcement 
or capture” and involves “predatory control of the immediate criminal 
environment through the creation of chaos and the infliction of terror, trauma, 
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and death on presenting targets” (Maniscalco & Christen, 2002).  Tactical 
violence includes the use of military weapons such as automatic weapons, 
rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades, mines, and mortars.   
 
The Black September group, Palestine Liberation Organization, Islamic 
Jihad, Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda have repeatedly used tactical violence 
relying on military weapons and improvised high-explosive devices.  Some of 
their massacres include 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972; 26 
tourists in Israel during 1978; 63 people in the U.S. Embassy and 241 U.S. 
Marines in their barracks in Beirut, and 111 people on a jet in 1983; 23 more 
people in the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and 18 U.S. Air Force personnel on their 
base in Spain in 1984; 58 passengers on a jet and 20 persons at U.S. and Israeli 
flight check-in desks at the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985; 259 passengers 
on Pan Am Flight 103 and 11 on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988; 19 
military personnel in Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996; 301 persons in 
the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that were bombed simultaneously in 
1998; 17 sailors on the U.S. Cole in Yemen in 2000; and some 3000 people in 
the attacks on both the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001 (Miller & 
File, 2001). 
 
3. ATTACKS USING CHEMICALS 
 
One chemical threat is from the release of chemical warfare agents 
formulated to kill or injure.  The other chemical threat is from attacks on 
chemical plants, chemical storage facilities, and pipelines that spread toxic 
vapors and droplets of toxic chemicals. 
 
Chemical warfare agents include nerve agents such as sarin, phosgene, and 
chlorine gas that quickly cause death and blistering agents such as mustard.  
Simple sprayers and spills can be used to disperse chemical warfare agents.  In 
1995, members of the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult went into a Tokyo subway 
station and punctured plastic bags of liquid sarin, which evaporated causing the 
death of 12 people and over 5,500 injuries (Murakami, 1998).  Placing a 
chemical warfare agent in an air circulation system can quickly contaminate 
entire buildings.   
 
Nerve agents block the activity of an enzyme, which regulates organs and 
glands in the body, resulting in dangerous over-stimulation.  Within seconds of 
inhalation symptoms appear including reddened watery eyes, small pupils, 
blurred vision, headache, nausea, vomiting, runny nose, increased salivation, 
and shortness of breath.  If the concentration of vapor is high, consciousness is 
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lost, seizures begin, breathing stops, and death occurs within 5 to 10 minutes.  
With a liquid droplet on the skin, usually consciousness will be suddenly lost 
within 30 minutes, breathing ceases, and paralysis and death follow, without 
any preliminary symptoms (Maniscalco & Christen, 2002). 
 
The second type of threat is from explosions at chemical plants, chemical 
storage facilities, and in chemical transport equipment that spread vapors and 
droplets of toxic chemicals.  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
requires approximately 15,000 facilities that produce or store toxic chemicals to 
report what could happen in a “worst-case scenario” if wind conditions carried 
toxic vapors and droplets to surrounding areas.  In a “worst-case scenario” at 
over 2,000 facilities, more than 100,000 people could be exposed to toxic 
chemicals from an explosion (Begley, 2001a). 
 
4. ATTACKS USING BIOLOGICAL AGENTS 
 
Biological threats involve agents which kill and agents that incapacitate 
people for a period of time.  Lethal agents include anthrax and plague, which 
can spread to others through contact with lesions and secretions.  A feature of 
these live bacteriological warfare agents is an incubation period of several days 
prior to the onset of symptoms of illness that rapidly lead to death in most cases 
if not medically treated.  In the case of anthrax, treatment is usually not 
effective unless it begins before symptoms are present.  In 1993, Aum 
Shinrikyo cultured anthrax and sprayed it from the roof of a building in Tokyo 
(Terrorism Files, 2002).  In October 2001, anthrax was mailed within the U.S. 
to a publishing company, members of Congress, and a television network.  A 
few deaths resulted, and hundreds of people who might have been exposed 
were prescribed Cipro to fight anthrax.  Buildings were shut down for weeks 
for decontamination.  The U.S. Office of Technology Assessment has estimated 
that a single small plane flying over Washington, D.C. spreading 220 pounds of 
anthrax spores could kill between 1 and 3 million people and make the city 
uninhabitable for years (Stephenson, 1996).   
 
Neurotoxins are another class of lethal biological warfare agents.  
Clostridium is a family of microorganisms that secretes toxins that cause 
muscle paralysis, respiratory failure, spasms, convulsions, tissues to die and 
decay, blood vessels to leak, and liver damage.  Ricin is produced from castor 
bean seeds and causes blood vessels to collapse.  Some marine animals and 
amphibians produce tetrodotoxins that cause paralysis and respiratory failure.  
Some fungi produce trichothecene mycotoxins that inhibit protein and DNA 
synthesis and destroy cell membranes.  The onset of effects is quick, ranging 
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from minutes to a few hours, and death may occur within a few minutes or 
days, depending on the neurotoxin and the exposure (Maniscalco & Christen, 
2002).  In 1984, a Paris Police raid on a German Red Army Faction apartment 
discovered documentation for producing biological warfare agents and a 
bathtub filled with flasks containing clostridium botulinum (Maniscalco & 
Christen, 2002).  In 1993, Aum Shinrikyo cultured clostridium botulinum and 
sprayed it around Japanese national legislative buildings (Crime Library, 2002).  
Also, in January 2003, seven North Africans suspected to be members of al 
Qaeda were arrested for producing ricin in their London apartment (BBC, 
2003a), and in March vials of ricin were found in a storage locker at a Paris 
train station (BBC, 2003b). 
 
Drinking water systems are especially vulnerable to biological warfare 
agents.  In 1993, 400 thousand people became ill in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and 
over 50 died when cryptosporidium passed undetected through drinking water 
treatment plants.  Municipal water systems use chlorine to kill e. coli, 
salmonella, and other common microorganisms, but typically do not test for 
botulinum toxin, or cryptosporidium that can be killed with ozone, and anthrax 
spores that can be trapped with filters.  (Begley, 2001b) 
 
Non-lethal biological agents include staphylococcal enterotoxins, a common 
source of food poisoning, and vomiting agents that are easy to spread through 
food and act quickly to cause nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea.  To influence an 
election outcome, the Bagwan Sri Rajneesh sect spread salmonella on salad 
bars in four restaurants in The Dalles, Oregon in 1984, causing 750 people to 
become too sick to vote (Maniscalco & Christen, 2002) 
 
5. ATTACKS USING NUCLEAR AGENTS 
 
One nuclear terrorism threat is from weapons designed to cause radiation 
sickness and death.  Nuclear materials and nuclear weapons stored in the 
former Soviet Union have not been adequately safeguarded, and former Soviet 
military officers have been weapons suppliers to al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf in the 
Philippines, and other terrorist groups (Farah, 2002).  The other threat is from 
attacks on nuclear plants, nuclear waste storage facilities, and transportation 
equipment carrying nuclear fuel or waste.  An explosion at any one of 103 
active private nuclear power plants in the U.S. or their waste storage facilities 
where 45,000 tons of radioactive spent fuel rods are stored could result in mass 
casualties (Magnusson, et al., 2001).  
 
Al Qaeda documents, found after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, revealed 
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that al Qaeda had a design for a nuclear weapon requiring plutonium, a design 
for a “dirty bomb” which could use discarded nuclear power plant fuel rods and 
explosives to disperse radioactive debris over large areas leaving them 
uninhabitable, and may have been helped by two Pakistani nuclear scientists 
who helped Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons (Boettcher & Arnesen, 2002). 
 
Nuclear weapons and “dirty bombs”, which use explosives to spread 
radioactive materials over a wide area, present threats to health from two 
sources, detonation and radioactive decay of atoms.  If regular explosives cause 
detonation, those near the blast site will be threatened from shock waves and 
debris traveling at high velocity.  If a nuclear chain reaction causes detonation, 
they will also be threatened by intense gamma radiation in the area of the blast 
site.  Gamma rays can strip electrons from atoms in body tissues.  Radioactive 
fallout is a health threat in nuclear chain reactions and “dirty bombs” to both 
those near the blast site and those downwind of the source of radiation.  Fallout 
consists of dust particles containing lethal radioactive isotopes that continually 
decay and emit gamma rays.  Inhalation or ingestion of radioactive particles 
can result in damage that may manifest itself within hours, days, weeks, or 
years.  Acute exposure may cause death, destruction of bone marrow, and 
incapacitation of the digestive and nervous systems.  Other effects include 
sterility, birth defects in unborn children, and cancer.  Preventing inhalation, 
ingestion, and quick decontamination of the skin if exposed to fallout are 
critical to minimize health threats (Maniscalco & Christen, 2002). 
 
III. PROTECTING AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS  
AND MITIGATING DAMAGE 
 
Terrorists typically look for a weakness or unsecured point of entry that can 
be exploited.  Then they attempt to create an incident of such magnitude that 
resources available to respond are overwhelmed.  There are five steps to be 
taken to protect against terrorist attacks and to mitigate damage.  They are 
awareness, planning, equipping, securing, and training. 
 
1. AWARENESS 
 
The first step in defending against terrorism is to perform a security audit to 
identify potential threats and weaknesses in security.  If managers have not had 
comprehensive training in security, security consultants should be involved.  
Police, fire, and emergency medical services should be involved in the security 
audit.  The security audit team should consist of people who collectively are 
knowledgeable about all conceivable threats and safeguards. 
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The World Trade Center and Pentagon, symbols of American power and 
nerve centers, were targets of terrorists.  Any organization that is a symbol of 
American power, nerve center, or in proximity of critical political, economic, 
transportation, or communications infrastructure is more likely to be at risk. 
 
Nuclear power plants, chemical plants, refineries, chemical and fuel storage 
facilities, as well as pipelines and transportation equipment that transport 
nuclear materials and chemicals are potential terrorist targets because of the 
mass casualties that could be caused to those in the vicinity and downwind.  
Public water supply systems are typically unsecured and easy targets for 
distributing deadly toxins.  Building ventilation systems can be used to quickly 
spread biological, chemical, or radiological agents.   
 
Data networks can be hacked to shut down the power grid, 
telecommunications, 911 emergency system, or to steal funds to finance 
terrorism.  Organizations with enormous computing and data transmission 
capacity are tempting targets for hackers who want to spread computer viruses 
that overwhelm the Internet.  Organizations holding financial assets in digital 
form and confidential credit information are tempting targets for hackers who 
delete data security programs to allow undetected system entry and theft. 
 
Climate is another factor to consider in threat assessment.  In a desert, 
biological agents are unlikely to cause mass casualties due to the difficulty the 
agent will have surviving in a low humidity environment outside of living 
hosts.  In humid, forested locations, biological agents can survive outside of 
living hosts and proliferate quickly over large areas.  In a desert, chemical 
agents would be likely to cause mass casualties over wide areas, while in 
forested locations the tree canopy would provide some protection to those on 
the ground level.  Prevailing winds and terrain are another factor to consider.  
Are you downwind of any likely targets?  If you live in a valley, dust would 
tend to collect there raising the risk of exposure to fallout. 
 
A series of questions should be answered about security weaknesses.  A 
partial list follows: 
 
• Is critical electronic data secure from tampering and archived at safe remote 
locations?   
• Are there areas within your facilities where only authorized personnel 
should be allowed?   
• Are restricted areas secured with locks, alarms, surveillance cameras, and or 
guards? 
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• Have background checks been done on persons authorized to enter 
restricted areas? 
• Is non-forgeable or non-transferable identification used to verify authorized 
access? 
 
2. PLANNING 
 
Predicting where, when, and how a terrorist attack will occur is impossible.  
The best defense to minimize damage from terrorism is to assume that 
terrorism will occur, to prepare for it, and to develop contingency plans for 
what would be done by whom in the event of an assortment of possible 
disasters identified through threat and security system vulnerability 
assessments.  Ultimately, organizational plans must be linked to community 
plans to minimize damage.  But realistically, there are many varieties of 
terrorist threats that would quickly overwhelm community resources for 
disaster response.  Organizations should prepare to respond to terrorist events 
in which professional emergency response units are delayed for extended 
periods of time because of mass casualties or become secondary targets of a 
terrorist attack and are incapacitated. 
 
Planning should be executed on a need-to-know basis.  Explaining the 
security system and how it works to anyone who wants to know makes it easier 
for a terrorist to find out about the security system and to evade it.  People 
involved in disaster planning should be advised of the need for confidentiality.  
Disaster preparedness administrators will need to watch for information leaks 
and to monitor security systems and equipment for tampering and proper 
functioning.   
 
Off-site backup storage of data and backup equipment to keep data 
networks operating might be a part of the plan, depending on how crucial data 
files and data networks are to the organization and the community.  
Surveillance systems, lockdown systems, and highly trained security guards 
with personal protective equipment such as soft body armor, respiratory 
protection devices, and chemical protective clothing might be a part of the plan, 
depending on threat assessment.  Parts of the plan might include installing 
monitors for nuclear, biological, or chemical contamination linked to kill 
switches that shut down a building’s ventilation system as soon as a 
contaminant is detected; maintaining a stock of filters to trap contaminants and 
training maintenance personnel to quickly install filters in ventilation systems 
to restore a safe air supply; and monitoring the health of all people on site for 
symptoms linked to known contaminants. 
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Other parts of the plan might include training a security team to stock and 
issue supplies such as masks to people who could be exposed to biological, 
chemical, or nuclear contaminants.  Another part of the plan might include 
preparing to conduct mass decontamination.  If so, tent-like showers with 
privacy to convince potential victims to undergo voluntary decontamination, 
bleach, soap, clean clothes, and contaminated wastewater storage containers 
need to be stocked in advance.   
 
Being prepared to quarantine large numbers of people can be critical to 
containing infections from biological agents, as recently seen in the sudden 
outbreaks of SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome) in China and 
Toronto, Canada.  Biological agents such as SARS reproduce themselves 
quickly in the bodies of those contaminated, easily spread from those who have 
been contaminated to infect others, and quickly mutate into new strains to re-
infect those starting to recover from the initial strain.  Initial health symptoms 
from many bacteriological agents include fever, fatigue, and mild chest 
discomfort, not unlike a cold or flu.  If large numbers of people in an office, 
school, or other location suddenly report such symptoms, emergency medical 
personnel should be alerted.  Building areas and exposed individuals may need 
to be quarantined for observation.  Movements of individuals within the 
organization who are suspected of possible exposure may need to be restricted 
or traced.  Entry by individuals outside the organization suspected of possible 
exposure may also need to be restricted. 
 
3. EQUIPPING 
 
Effective planning should produce a list of equipment and supplies to be 
installed on-site for use by authorized personnel within the organization prior to 
the arrival of emergency response professionals.  This equipment must be kept 
near authorized personnel for easy issue in emergencies.  Plans might also 
include supplies and equipment to be cached for emergency response 
professionals to draw from once they arrive.  Access to this equipment must be 
restricted to emergency response professionals. 
 
Communication equipment to contact emergency response professionals 
and to convey instructions to employees and other persons on the premises is 
essential for all organizations.  It should not be assumed that telephones will 
work, that electricity will be available, or that people will not panic in the 
absence of quick information about the nature of the situation and clear 
authoritative directives of what to do coming from credible sources.  Each 
organization needs to designate in advance a temporary incident commander 
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within the organization and alternates, who will oversee emergency 
communications prior to professional emergency units assigning their own 
incident commander.  The temporary incident commander should be equipped 
with a battery-operated two-way radio to communicate with police, fire, and 
medical emergency responders if telephones fail to work.  Instructions from 
emergency responders or the temporary incident commander will need to be 
passed through internal personnel designated in advance as disaster wardens to 
alert all persons in their work areas of the emergency and to lead them to safety 
or shelter.  Depending on how facilities are configured, disaster wardens in 
remote buildings or on different floors may need also to be equipped with 
battery operated two-way radios for communicating with the incident 
commander, bullhorns for passing instructions along to those they are leading, 
and kits containing flash lights, first aid supplies, barrier tape to close off areas 
evacuated, and writing materials for taking note of who is safe, who is injured 
with what injuries, and who is unaccounted for to report to emergency 
responders involved in medical and search and rescue operations. 
 
First aid equipment for properly trained and certified first aid and 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) providers is also a consideration.  Red 
Cross certified first aid and CPR providers are forbidden from going beyond 
their skill levels; thus, first aid kits for them can be rather simple and 
inexpensive.  However, Red Cross does certify volunteers in the use of an 
Automatic External Defibrillator (AED), which may cost several thousand 
dollars.  CPR rarely restarts a heart but does circulate blood to vital organs and 
the brain to keep them alive prior to the arrival of an AED.  Every minute that 
passes when a heart has stopped beating increases the likelihood of death by 10 
percent, and that is why quick use of an AED on-site, followed by advanced 
cardiac support in a hospital is necessary to increase likelihood of recovery in 
the cardiac chain of survival (Red Cross, 2001).  Heart attacks could result 
from acts of terrorism, but also commonly result from heart disease and 
accidents; thus, an AED is an item of equipment organizations should consider 
having on their premises along with personnel certified to use an AED. 
 
Determination of what other equipment to stock should be based on threat 
assessment and the level of training of personnel within the organization to use 
the equipment.  If an organization is located near a nuclear, chemical, or 
biological facility, waste disposal site, or on a regular route for transferring 
such materials, then a Geiger counter or chemical “sniffer” might be included 
in the equipment list.  They cost a few hundred dollars each.  Decontamination 
showers that can properly contain contaminated wastewater, bags to seal 
airtight personal valuables such as wallets and purses for retrieval later after 
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decontamination, bags to seal contaminated clothing for proper disposal, 
bleach, soap, and fresh clothing or inexpensive Tyvek suits should also be 
considered.  In gross decontamination all clothing is removed and sealed in a 
trash bag so it doesn’t contaminate anything else.  This step alone is estimated 
to remove 70 to 95 percent of contamination.  Then the body is washed with 
water for one minute under a shower or water hose.  In secondary 
decontamination the body is washed vigorously with a 0.5 percent solution of 
sodium hypochlorite, which removes exposed surface skin cells along with 
fallout particles, chemicals, and or biological agents.  With certain biological 
agents, the skin may need to be in contact with a 0.5 percent solution of sodium 
hypochlorite for more than 10 minutes to be effective.  The solution can be 
prepared by mixing 10 parts water with 1-part undiluted household bleach.  
Then the body is rinsed thoroughly with water.  In the third stage, definitive 
decontamination, the body is washed thoroughly with soap and water, rinsed 
thoroughly with water, dried, and clean clothes are put on.  (Maniscalco & 
Christen, 2002)  
 
If tactical violence is believed to be a likely threat to an organization, 
perhaps because it is within or near a center of political power, is a symbol of 
power that terrorists would like to destroy, is a repository of financial wealth 
that could be robbed to finance terrorism, or provides important infrastructure 
to society, then equipping a professional security force and installing restricted 
area access identification systems, intruder detection alarm systems, 
surveillance cameras, and systems to automatically alert emergency response 
agencies to provide back-up for internal security personnel might be on the 
equipment list.  Soft body armor, self-contained breathing apparatus, and 
chemical protective clothing might be items to consider for internal security 
personnel. 
 
Depending on the threat assessment, supplies such as atropine, airways, and 
other items required in large quantities to treat mass casualties might be 
considered for caching on-site.  Organizations such as airport authorities, sports 
arenas, convention centers where likely targets of terrorists such as political 
leaders are in attendance, and organizations near biological and chemical 
weapons storage and disposal sites in various states might consider caching 
such supplies.  However, they must be secured to ensure access only by trained 
medical professionals after they arrive on the scene.   
 
Other equipment considerations might include installing direct 
communications links to emergency responders perhaps triggered by 
monitoring equipment and installing emergency power backup systems.  
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Organizations with electrical equipment that provides life support and valuable 
assets that could be destroyed without precise climate control should certainly 
include back-up power systems on their equipment lists. 
 
4. SECURING 
 
The first element in securing is to reduce vulnerabilities to unauthorized 
access to data networks, ventilation systems, critical utility conduits, 
connections to external utility providers and shutoffs, hazardous materials 
stored on the premises, security systems, emergency supply caches, and any 
other equipment and materials that might be of particular interest to terrorists.  
All of the above should be located on facility blueprints, inventoried, and 
secured in locked and restricted areas.  Access to facility blueprints showing 
locations of the above, access to inventories reporting detailed descriptions and 
quantities of items, and access to pass codes and keys should be carefully 
restricted to personnel who have a need to have them. 
 
The second element in securing is vigilance to detect attempts of 
unauthorized entry and tampering.  Vulnerable networks, systems, equipment, 
and materials will need to be checked regularly to ensure their integrity, and 
records should be kept to ensure that tampering or pilferage are detected.  
Entrusting vigilance over a particular system, equipment, or material solely to 
one individual may result in poor record keeping and loss of information if that 
person leaves the organization.  Security teams should be created and trained to 
maintain vigilance over designated systems, equipment, and materials.  
Personnel who maintain data networks, personnel knowledgeable about 
ventilation and utility systems in facilities services, and personnel with 
hazardous material training should be members of teams maintaining security 
over vulnerabilities that pertain to their areas of expertise. 
 
The third element in securing is forming an incident command team to 
coordinate response to an incident.  The command team should be composed of 
key officers in the organization who control security, expenditures, logistics, 
facilities services, and human resources.  The command team should strive to 
develop a seamless interface with police, fire, and emergency medical services 
as well as entering into mutual assistance agreements with other nearby 
organizations for emergency supplies, shelter, transportation, and other 
assistance as needed.  The command team, in coordination with professional 
emergency services, may order areas to be cleared of people and barricaded, 
and may designate shelter or assembly areas where persons who were on the 
premises are to report or be transported to be accounted for and assisted.  A 
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fairly large team of emergency wardens may be necessary to check presumably 
still safe areas for occupants, notify occupants of the emergency instructions, 
lead them to safety, and to account for them and refer them to any further 
assistance they may need.  The command team may also order areas to be 
cleared of organization personnel and vehicles and restricted for the exclusive 
use of incoming emergency service vehicles, personnel, and supplies.  The 
command team may direct facilities services and hazardous material personnel 
to assist in search and rescue operations by providing fire department personnel 
with facility blueprints with locations of utility shutoffs and hazardous 
materials.  The command team may assist emergency professionals in 
commandeering areas for victim medical triage, a temporary morgue, and 
police crime scene management.  The command team may also assist 
emergency services by ordering that support teams put up signs and barricades 
and post sentinels around the facilities to direct media to a location set up for an 
official spokesperson of the incident commander, and to prevent media, good 
Samaritans, curious bystanders, employees, customers, and potential looters 
from entering the premises. 
 
5. TRAINING 
 
Training should begin with the command team.  The command team needs 
to become aware of potential threats, prevention, and responses necessary to 
mitigate damage from incidents.  Unless members of the command team 
already have training from prior careers in emergency response agencies, the 
initial orientation and education of the command team should come from local 
emergency response agencies and municipal or country emergency managers.   
 
Learning by doing is the next part of training for the command team and 
begins with planning.  The Emergency Management Guide for Business & 
Industry published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 
2001 provides a detailed framework for the command team to develop an 
emergency response plan that fits the organization they command.  An outline 
of planning items is presented in Appendix 1.  As planning items are delegated 
to specific members of the command team, it should become clearer what types 
of information needs to be collected, and the material and personnel needed to 
implement the plan. 
 
The next step in training recommended by FEMA is for the command team 
to gather in a conference room to conduct emergency scenario exercises during 
which each member of the team explains the actions that he or she would take 
in a specific type of emergency.  The purpose of these exercises is to reveal 
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omissions in the organization’s emergency response plan, areas of overlapping 
responsibilities and confusion of command team members, and confusion of 
command team members in how the organization and emergency services will 
coordinate actions.  The command team will need to eliminate gaps in the 
emergency response plan, establish protocols for decision-making and how to 
implement decisions among command team members, and come to a mutual 
understanding with emergency response services regarding the proper actions 
of the command team prior to and after the arrival of emergency response 
services. 
 
Once command team members fully understand the scope of what they are 
to do prior to and after arrival of emergency response services, support teams of 
personnel will need to be formed to implement each element of the emergency 
response plan.  Support teams should include most or all of the following:  
security teams, facilities services teams, emergency warden teams to lead 
people to safe assembly points or shelter, logistics teams to arrange for 
emergency supplies and transportation, media teams to deal with the press, 
human resource teams to deal with inquiries from relatives and referrals to 
services, and recovery teams for salvage and continuing operations elsewhere.  
Each of these teams will need to receive orientation training and education in 
the organization’s emergency response plan. 
 
The next step in recommended training by FEMA is a walk-through drill 
involving a representative of each emergency service, the command team, and 
support teams.  Ideally, this training would be conducted during non-business 
hours when other persons are not on the premises.  Similar to the scenario 
exercises for the command team, this drill is intended to reveal areas of 
omission, overlap, and confusion among emergency services, the command 
team, and support teams, which should be remedied prior to involving all 
personnel.  After a walk-through drill and remedying deficiencies, FEMA 
recommends evacuation and shelter drills involving all employees walking 
routes to collection points or shelters, accounting for persons, and identifying 
missing persons.   
 
Finally, to test preparedness for the real thing, the organization may conduct 
a full-scale exercise simulating an emergency with individuals play-acting 
victims and involving emergency service commanders, the organization 
command team, support teams, all employees, and community emergency 
response organizations.  While such exercises are disruptive and may be costly 
in terms of paid hours diverted from income producing activities, they are 
useful in spreading awareness of appropriate responses beyond emergency 
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responders and in reinforcing correct responses among emergency responders.  
All members of the organization should be involved in some training sessions.  
It is not enough to provide everyone with written guidelines of what to do 
during various types of emergencies that, if read at all, are quickly filed away 
and forgotten or lost.  With the threats facing organizations in America today, it 
is necessary to train people to respond to instructions to take cover inside 
secure buildings, to don appropriate personal protective equipment, and to 
undergo decontamination procedures if deemed necessary by emergency 
incident commanders. 
 
Training for the organization’s internal emergency response team members 
must be frequent, flexible, and involve realistic exercises and drills.  In actual 
disasters, classroom-only trained personnel have been known to freeze, panic, 
and forget everything they were taught.  Reactions to disaster situations need to 
become automatic, and they need to be correct the first time.  There is no 
substitute for regular training several times a year. 
 
IV. A CASE STUDY:  MESA STATE COLLEGE 
 
Thus far this paper has covered the threats of terrorism and given 
prescriptions for dealing with the threats.  However, complacency can be a 
major impediment to implementing any of these prescriptions in an 
organization, especially when people feel so safe in their local environment that 
terrorist threats are thought to only involve people in other parts of the world, 
and during economically difficult times when talent, time, and money to 
address security issues are all in short supply.  The experience of Mesa State 
College, which has faced both of these impediments, may provide insights to 
other organizations that are contemplating or dealing with security issues.   
 
Mesa State College is located in a thinly populated pastoral area of farms, 
orchards, ranches, and federal lands in Western Colorado, about 250 miles 
away from the major cities of Denver to the east and Salt Lake City to the west.  
Although attempts of unknown computer hackers to hijack the campus 
computer network to launch attacks elsewhere, corrupt files, or simply to deny 
service to campus users had been an ongoing problem, which the Computing & 
Network Systems Department had kept at bay, no college emergency response 
plan existed prior to 2001 concerning other types of vulnerabilities to terrorism, 
and none was thought to be necessary.   
 
In 2001, a telephone call to campus stated that a bomb had been placed in 
an unspecified campus building.  The call prompted a total campus evacuation 
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order and a room-by-room search of all buildings by the police bomb squad.  
Fortunately, no bomb was found, and later it was discovered that a disgruntled 
former employee of the college had made the threat.  In effect, the entire 
campus community and local emergency services had been forced to undergo a 
full-scale exercise simulating an emergency, and the responses of untrained 
staff and students were troubling.  While dormitory staff trained in fire 
evacuation procedures could be seen with bull horns keeping groups of students 
together and leading them in an orderly manner to marshalling points off 
campus, elsewhere the evacuation order was implemented by department 
secretaries simply walking from classroom to classroom and office to office to 
notify people to leave buildings.  Restrooms were sometimes overlooked, some 
staff ignored the evacuation order, and some students took their time in exiting, 
with many either casually milling around outside the buildings awaiting classes 
to resume, or leaving campus and creating congestion on streets around campus 
that could have been needed for emergency vehicle access.   
 
Shortly after the bomb threat incident, an Emergency Operations Response 
Plan for the college was developed based on the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Emergency Management Guide for Business & 
Industry, and responsibility for implementing the plan was given to the 
Environment, Health & Safety Committee co-chaired by the Director of 
Facilities Services and a Grand Junction Police Officer assigned to the college.  
After the plan was discussed by committee members it became apparent that 
few college staff had the skills or training to be helpful in dealing with a 
terrorist-caused emergency, with the exception of School of Nursing faculty 
who could assist in medical matters, food and housing staff who could assist in 
shelter matters, and Facilities Services staff who could assist in emergency 
utility shutoffs, damage assessments, and repairs.  Thus, the committee decided 
to focus on those elements of the plan that could be implemented quickly and to 
defer elements of the plan requiring far more time, training, and resources to 
implement.  Those elements of the plan that could be implemented quickly 
included preparing to evacuate all staff and students to assembly points or 
shelter in an orderly way, and on verifying and compiling up-to-date building 
blueprints, inventories of hazardous materials in laboratories and shops, and 
locations of utility shut offs to make available to emergency response services.   
 
Emergency wardens were assigned for every floor and wing of every 
building on campus, and reverse 911 lines were installed on their telephones to 
allow the campus command team to issue instructions simultaneously and 
directly through every warden’s telephone, which would act as a loud speaker 
without requiring the receiver to be lifted.  All wardens participated in a 
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training exercise and were equipped with fluorescent vests so that they could be 
easily recognized and hopefully obeyed.  Up-to-date building blueprints were 
compiled quickly, but much effort was required in the hazardous materials area 
partly because of staff turnover.  Successive drastic cuts to college funding, a 
hiring freeze, and layoffs in facilities services slowed momentum. 
 
A heightened state of national terrorism alert during the 2003 war in Iraq 
brought a visit from the County Emergency Manager, who explained how the 
federal, state, county, and city officials and emergency response professionals 
would interface with officials of the college.  Committee members updated lists 
of emergency team members and phone numbers following recent layoffs and 
reorganizations, found money to buy an emergency two-way radio and a 
bullhorn for the college president, began to check the adequacy of the contents 
of all first aid kits on campus, began to prepare evacuation kits for building 
evacuation wardens, developed an evacuation and transport plan for small 
children in the campus day care center, and trained or re-certified custodians 
and other interested staff in CPR and first aid. 
 
Two years have passed since the bomb threat triggered serious preparation 
for a terrorist threat or any other disaster related emergency.   Significant 
progress has been made, but much remains to be done.  More personnel need to 
become involved and to be adequately trained and equipped to take care of 
themselves and others in the event of a terrorist attack or any other disaster 
emergency before emergency responders arrive, and then support emergency 
responders after they arrive.  One may still ask whether the college, because of 
its remote location, really should concern itself with chemical, biological, or 
nuclear threats.  If one considers that the college is located a few miles from an 
east-west main line of the Union Pacific Railroad which transports hazardous 
chemicals, a few miles from Interstate 70 that was recently designated a route 
for transporting nuclear waste to a Nevada repository, and that epidemics such 
as SARS can turn up anywhere, anytime, a prudent person would say yes. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Terrorism is a threat that we will likely have to live with for a long time.  
Rather than let it take control of our lives and activities, we can take 
preventative and emergency response precautions to minimize the impact it has 
on our lives.  Moreover, natural disasters and accidents without motive occur at 
random all the time.  Even though the odds of being directly affected may be 
low, consequences can be so severe to such a large number of victims that not 
to prepare is irresponsible.  Preparation is not something that happens overnight 
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by executive decree, even with the full support of organizational members and 
unlimited resources.  Even under orders from the President of the United States 
and with the full resources of the federal government, it took over a year to 
complete the initial stages of establishing reliable security at the nation’s major 
airports after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.  Preparation takes a 
sustained effort and a commitment of resources over time, which may be 
counted in years.  If your organization has not started to prepare, the time to 
start is now.  Just meeting with representatives of your local emergency 
response services to find ways to mutually assist one another is a good way to 
begin.   
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Steps to Prepare for Disasters (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2000) 
 
• Establish a planning team 
o Line management and human resources manager 
o Safety, security, and medical personnel 
o Public information officer 
o Support services managers 
o Community emergency response organization managers 
• Analyze capabilities and hazards 
o Potential emergencies and probabilities 
o Human impact, property impact, and business impact 
o Internal resources available and adequacy to deal with an emergency 
o External resources available and other priority areas they must serve 
o Resource gap closing additional emergency procedures, training, equipment, and 
mutual aid agreements 
• Develop an emergency operations response plan. 
o Direction and control 
§ Incident Commander (IC) to oversee all technical aspects of incident response 
activities and IC succession plan 
§ Protocols with outside emergency response organizations to turn over 
incident command and coordinate organizational support 
§ Emergency Management Group (EMG) of senior managers who can allocate 
internal resources relevant to the emergency to the IC and are authorized to 
interface with outside agencies and the media 
§ Emergency Operations Command Center (EOC) in a secure area where IC 
and EMG gather with necessary communications equipment and materials 
available, including an alternate location 
o Communications 
§ Alarms understood by employees to notify of a type of emergency 
§ Warning procedures to notify customers and visitors on premises 
§ EOC communications to mobilize internal teams of emergency responders, 
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coordinate with external emergency response organizations, and respond to 
inquiries from employees’ families, neighbors, and the media 
o Life safety 
§ Authority to order evacuation or to proceed to shelter 
§ Evacuation routes and exits clearly marked and well lit 
§ Wardens to assist others  
§ Assembly areas to account for those present and missing persons to be 
reported to the EOC with last known locations 
§ Search and rescue operations 
o Property protection 
§ Fire protection systems 
§ Automatic shutoffs and emergency power 
§ Fire resistant furnishings 
§ Securely attached lights, cabinets, and heavy objects 
§ Window coverings to protect from flying glass 
§ Authority to order facility shutdown and shutdown procedures 
§ Vital files and equipment secured or moved to a safe location 
§ Restriction of reentry 
o Community outreach 
§ Review of emergency plans with emergency response groups 
§ Facility walk-through and drills with emergency response groups 
§ Mutual aid agreements with local response agencies and businesses to receive 
or provide resources 
§ Media briefing area and authorized spokesperson 
o Recovery and restoration 
§ Maintaining security at the incident scene 
§ Initial assessment of damage and remaining hazards 
§ Coverings for openings in building to protect undamaged property 
§ Insurance coverage and insurance adjuster visits to the incident scene 
§ Priorities for bringing utility systems back on-line 
§ Salvage operations to segregate damaged and undamaged property 
§ Priorities for repairing or replacing equipment 
§ Plan for temporarily relocating operations to an alternate site 
§ Established lines of succession for key personnel 
§ Continuation of employee pay and benefits and crisis counseling 
o Administration and logistics 
§ Maintaining detailed records of plans, training, and drills 
§ Maintaining detailed records of incident events, accounting for personnel, and 
notification of family members 
§ Documenting recovery investigations and operations and managing finances 
§ Stockpiling emergency supplies, acquiring emergency equipment, designating 
command center and alternate site, designating and stocking shelters 
§ Providing utility and floor plan maps to emergency responders 
§ Providing material safety data sheets 
§ Arranging for backup equipment, medical support, food and transportation, 
and backup communications 
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